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Recent Developments
Montgomery County v. Lake:
EMPLOYER NOT ALLOWED TO
OFFSET OVERPAYMENT OF
WORKERS' COMPENSATION
BENEFITS
In Montgomery County v. Lake, 68 Md.
App. 269, 511 A.2d 541 (1986), a case of
first impression, the Maryland Court of
Special Appeals held that Maryland Code
Ann. Art. 101, § 56, does not allow an employer to offset the overpayment of workmen's compensation benefits in one claim
against a second award granted to an injured employee. In so holding, the court
affirmed the decision by the Circuit Court
for Montgomery County.
The appellee, Charles Lake, a Montgomery County employee, made two separate claims for workmen's compensation
benefits. On his first claim, the Workers'
Compensation Commission determined
that Lake sustained a thirty percent loss of
the use of his body because of injury to his
lungs and ordered permanent partial disability benefits for a period of 150 weeks.
On the second claim, the Commission determined that Lake suffered a five percent
loss of his right hand and a fifteen percent
loss of the use of his body as a result ofinjuries to his nose, right shoulder and right
elbow sustained after a second unrelated
injury. The Commission ordered benefits
for this injury for a period of87.5 weeks.
Id. at 271,511 A.2d at 542.
Montgomery County appealed the Commission's decision. The Circuit Court for
Montgomery County granted the County's
motion for partial summary judgment and
ordered that the payments awarded on the
second claim not be paid until the payments
under the first claim were completed. After
the decision by the circuit court, Lake applied to the Commission for a lump sum
payment of the amount awarded on the
first claim. The Commission granted the
application and accelerated $4,000.00 of
the $4,711.00 then due Lake under that
award.Id.
In a jury trial on the first claim, the
County won its appeal and the jury reduced
Lake's permanent partial disability from
thirty percent to ten percent. This reduc-

tion created an overpayment of$8,900.00
in benefits on the first claim because all of
the payments due under that claim had already been paid. At the time of the jury's
decision, there remained $1,600.00 unpaid
on the second claim. The County, in an effort to recoup the overpayment, suspended
the payment of benefits due under the second claim without either formal notice to
Lake or prior approval by the Commission.
Lake complained to the Commission and a
hearing was conducted in which the Commission ruled that the County was not entitled to offset the overpayment in the first
claim against the unpaid, unaccrued benefits awarded in the second claim. Id. at
272, 511 A.2d at 542-43.
The County appealed the Workers' Compensation Commission's orders to the Circuit Court for Montgomery County. The
court upheld the decision of the Commission reasoning that, "[t]here is a presumption of propriety that attaches to any determination by the Workmen's Compensation
Commission .... " Id. at 272, 511 A.2d
at 543.
On appeal to the Maryland Court of
Special Appeals, the County asserted that
the overpayment of compensation benefits
in one claim should be offset against the
same type of benefits awarded in another
claim when the latter benefits are unpaid
and unaccrued when the overpayment
arose. The County also contended that a
credit was necessary to prevent unjust
enrichment to Lake because he received
benefits in excess of that which he was entitled. Id. at 274, 511 A.2d at 544.
In rejecting the County's claims, the
court of special appeals observed that it is
firmly established in Maryland that once
moneys are paid out on a claim, those funds
are not recoverable "on any theory," absent fraud, even if the award is reduced or
reversed on appeal. Id. at 274, 511 A.2d at
544 (citing St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co.
v. Treadwell, 263 Md. 430, 439 (1971».
The County had contended that it was not
seeking recovery back of funds paid out,
but instead was merely offsetting funds
overpaid in one claim against unpaid, unaccrued funds awarded in a second claim,
and therefore St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins.

Co. was not applicable. The Maryland
Court of Special Appeals concluded that
whether the County terms it "offset" or
"recovery back," the effect is the same and
the claimant is deprived of funds awarded
to him for a separate injury. Id. at 275, 511
A.2d at 544.
The Court noted that the Maryland
Court of Appeals has held that ''the Workmen's Compensation Act establishes a procedure of its own covering every phase of
the right to compensation and of the procedure for obtaining and enforcing it,
which procedure is complete and exclusive
in itself." St. Paul Fire & Man·ne Ins. Co.,
263 Md. at 436 (quoting Tompkins v.
George Rinner Constr. Co., 409 P.2d 1001,
1003 (1966». In St. Paul Fire & Marine
Ins. Co., the court interpreted Art. 101,
§ 56 and concluded that since the Act did
not provide a procedure for recovery of
funds after overpayment, it was the intent
of the legislature to prohibit such a right.
Id. The court in Lake similarly held that
since the compensation statute does not
provide a procedure to offset separate
claims when overpayment results, the legislature did not intend to permit this procedure. Id. See also Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v. Oros, 301 Md. 460, 483
A.2d 748 (1984).
The court in Lake then addressed the
question of whether recovery back of funds
is permissible where the sum paid out on a
claim was awarded under the lump sum
provisions of the Act. The court analyzed
the holding in Bayshore Indus., Inc. v.
Ziats, 229 Md. 69, 76-77 181 A.2d.652
(1962), which found that "a stay of payment awarded by reasons of an appeal
challenging the underlying award is prohibited." 68 Md. App. at 577, 511 A.2d at
545. The Bayshore Indus., Inc. court also
held that "the purpose behind the prohibition is that of affording day-to-day
support to an injured employee and his or
her dependents." Id. Following this rationale, the court of appeals in St. Paul
Fire & Marine Ins. Co. held that restitution or recovery back of payments would
not be permitted because "it is not the intention and spirit of the Workmen's Compensation Act to allow an employer to
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recover back money paid under an award
which already has been spent by a claimant for living expenses." /d.
In Lake, the Maryland Court of Special
Appeals stated that they are not unmindful
of the potential inequities presented by
this appeal. In theory, no one would disagree that funds which are disbursed without ultimate legal vindication should be
recoverable, however, after a lump sum
award is made, it is difficult to justify taking back the money which has already been
used for living expenses. This question
poses a real dilemma and until the legislature addresses these problems, these potential inequities will surely occur again.

- J.

Russell Fentress IV

Anderson v. Bimblich: RECOVERY
OF WORKER'S COMPENSATION
BENEFITS PRECLUDES
RECOVERY IN TORT ACTION
The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland in A nderson v. Bimblich, 67 Md. App.
612,508 A.2d 1014 (1986), has held that
an employee of a property management
company under contract to the owners of
an apartment building, injured while performing custodial duties under a subcontract with the building owners, and recovers worker's compensation benefits, may
not later pursue a tort action against the
owners if they are deemed "principal contractors," thus constituting a statutory employer within the meaning of the Worker's
Compensation Act (the "Act"), Md. Ann.
Code art. 10 1, § 62 (1985).
On December 10, 1981, appellant Cyril
Anderson suffered serious injuries resulting in the amputation of his right hand
while operating a trash compactor in his
capacity as custodian at the Barbazon
Plaza Apartment complex. At the time
of the accident Anderson was employed
by the Smith-Braedon Property Co.,
("Smithy") pursuant to a contract with the
appellees, Barbazon Plaza Associates (Barbazon), a partnership of which the named
defendant Bimblich was a member. Under
the terms of the contract, Smithy was to
provide property management, custodial,
and maintenance services for the apartment complex. Anderson subsequently
filed for and received worker's compensation benefits for his injury.
Unsatisfied, Anderson proceeded to file
a "third party" suit against Barbazon, alleging negligence in the latter's maintenance of a defective and dangerous trash
compactor on the premises. Anderson's
suit was filed pursuant to § 58 of the Worker's Compensation Act, which provides
that an injured employee who previously
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received benefits under the Act, could also
elect to seek damages against a person
other than the employer for negligence
jointly caused by the employer and some
other third party. See Md. Ann. Code,
art. 101, § 58 (1985).
In the Circuit Court for Montgomery
County, Barbazon filed for, and the trial
judge granted, a motion for summary
judgment on the grounds that Barbazon
was Anderson's statutory employer within
the meaning of§ 58 of the Act. Under the
exclusive remedy provisions of§ 15 of the
Act, an employee was barred from suing
his employer to recover damages arising
out of the employer's negligence if the employee previously elected to seek benefits
under the Act. See Md. Ann. Code, art.
101, § 15 (1985). Undeterred, Anderson
appealed.
Presented with a case of first impression,
the court addressed the question of whether
the appellees (Barbazon) were the statutory
employer of Anderson, which if answered
in the affirmative, would bar Anderson's
recovery as a matter oflaw.
The court first determined that the exclusive remedy provisions of § 15 of the
Act barred an employee who had previously
elected to recover worker's compensation
from later suing his employer for tort damages. The court next determined that notwithstanding § 15, an employee could
undertake to sue a person other than the
employer to recover tort damages, so long
as the party sued was not his statutory employer within the meaning of § 62 of the
Act.
To determine whether the appellees in
the instant case were the statutory employers of Anderson, the court relied on
the holding of the Court of Appeals of
Maryland in Honaker v. W.C. and A.N.
Miller Dev. Co., 278 Md. 453, 365 A.2d
287 (1976). In considering whether the
employer was a "principal contractor",.
and thus the statutory employer of an employee injured while installing a slate roof,
the Honaker court specified four elements
that must be satisfied to bring an employer
within the scope of§ 62. The four elements
are: (1) a principal contractor; (2) who has
contracted to perform work; (3) which is a
part of his trade, business, or occupation;
and (4) who has contracted with any other
party as a subcontractor for the execution
by or under the subcontractor of the whole
or any part of such work. Anderson, 67
Md. App. at 617,508 A.2d at 1016.
The key determinant under Honaker was
whether the contract between the principal
contractor and the subcontractor arose out
of the original contract between the parties,
or resulted from a contract entered into by
the principal contractor and a third party.

As applied to the case at bar, if the subcontract for custodial services arose out of the
original contract between Barbazon and
Smithy, Barbazon as "principal contractor"
would be designated as the statutory employer of Anderson. However, the Honaker
court cautioned that the preliminary finding was subject to application of the "essential or integral part" test. Under this
test, a finding that the "subcontracted work
is an 'essential or integral' part of the principal contractor's business" is required.
Miller Dev. Co. v. Honaker, 40 Md. App.
185,388 A.2d 562 (1978), a/i'd, 285 Md:
216,401 A.2d 1013 (1979).
In applying the elements of the test set
forth in Honaker to the facts of the case at
bar, the court found that the first two elements were satisfied by evidence contained
in the tenant-lease agreements which clearly
designated Smithy as an agent/landlord of
Barbazon. Additionally, the court found
that a subcontract between Barbazon and
the tenants to provide custodial services
existed because of the landlord's promise,
contained in the leases, to "deliver the
premises and all areas in a clean, safe, and
sanitary condition." Anderson, 67 Md.
App. at 619,508 A.2d at 1017.
The court further held that the third element of Honaker was satisfied by the fact
that the subcontract to provide custodial
services for the benefit of the tenants was
"an essential or integral" part ofBarbazon's
business as apartment owners. Lastly, the
court held that the fourth element was satisfied because the maintenance subcontract
was viewed as being part of the original
property management contract between the
appellees and Smithy, and not the result of
a separate contract between Barbazon and
some other third party, in this case the
tenants themselves.
In holding that apartment owners who
contract with a property management
company to provide custodial services by
way of a subcontract are the "principal
contractors," and thus the statutory employer of a custodian injured during the
course of his employment, the court has
expanded the meaning of statutory employer under § 62 of the Worker's Compensation Act to encompass apartment
building owners. The decision of the court
thus extends the protections inherent in
the Act to apartment building owners who
subcontract for custodial services under
a pre-existing property management contract. Employees injured through the employer's negligence who have previously
elected to seek benefits under § 15 of the
Act, will continue to be precluded from
bringing suit against a statutory employer
as defined under § 62 of the Act.

- Kenneth S. Savell

